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This Article explores the underappreciated constitutional problems that arise when regulators
compel Internet services to disclose information about their editorial operations and
decisions (what the Article calls “mandatory editorial transparency”). In particular, this
Article highlights the inevitable problems caused by regulators’ attempts to confirm the
accuracy of Internet services’ disclosures. The prospect of such enforcements will motivate
Internet services to change their decisions to please regulators—thus having the same effect
on speech as more direct, and obviously unconstitutional, speech regulations. This makes
mandatory editorial transparency regulations another policy dead-end in regulators’ quest
to control online speech.
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INTRODUCTION
Federal and state regulators around the country have made it a high priority
to “fix” user-generated content (UGC) on the Internet. Many regulators would
simply prefer to tell Internet services1 what UGC they must, can, or cannot
publish. However, that option is unconstitutional; plus, there’s a deep partisan
divide over what content should be published online.2
To bypass these obstacles, requiring Internet services to provide more
“transparency” has emerged as an attractive plan B for regulators. For example,
in 2021, Florida and Texas imposed wide-ranging disclosure obligations3 on
“social media platforms.”4 Mandatory transparency laws are generally popular,5
and they are widely viewed as less constitutionally problematic than outright
censorship.6 After all, mandatory disclosure laws are prevalent in our society,
and they often survive constitutional scrutiny.7
This Article explores the underappreciated constitutional problems that
arise when regulators compel Internet services to disclose information about
their editorial operations and decisions (what this Article calls “mandatory
editorial transparency”). In particular, this Article highlights the inevitable
problems caused by regulators’ attempts to confirm the accuracy of Internet
services’ disclosures. The prospect of such enforcements will motivate Internet
services to change their decisions to please regulators—thus having the same
effect on speech as more direct, and obviously unconstitutional, speech

1. Synonyms for “Internet services” include “platforms” (used in the Florida, Texas and Maryland laws
discussed herein), “social media,” and “UGC services.”
2. Republicans generally want to compel Internet services to carry more UGC, including anti-social
content. Democrats generally want Internet services to remove more UGC, even constitutionally protected
content.
3. This Article uses “transparency requirements” and “mandatory disclosure” interchangeably.
4. Florida defined “social media platform” as “any information service, system, Internet search engine,
or access software provider that [p]rovides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including an Internet platform or a social media site,” subject to additional qualifications. FLA. STAT.
§ 501.2041(1)(g) (2021). Texas defined “social media platform” as “an Internet website or application that is
open to the public, allows a user to create an account, and enables users to communicate with other users for the
primary purpose of posting information, comments, messages, or images,” also subject to additional
qualifications. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 120.001(1) (West 2021).
5. See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND
PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY xiii (2007) (“Who could oppose providing more information to the public?”).
6. See, e.g., MARK MACCARTHY, TRANSATLANTIC WORKING GRP., TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR
DIGITAL SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS AND INDUSTRY 2, 29 (2020),
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Transparency_MacCarthy_Feb_2020.pdf [hereinafter MACCARTHY
TAWG] (“[T]ransparency does not raise the free expression issues that bedevil mandated requirements for
removal of problematic material . . . [it] limits the dangers to democratic self-governance that arise when
government agencies are able to control the flow of information citizens rely upon for making democratic
decisions.”).
7. See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45700, ASSESSING COMMERCIAL DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (2019), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45700.pdf
(“Commercial disclosure requirements have largely withstood constitutional scrutiny”) [hereinafter CRS
REPORT].
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regulations. This makes mandatory editorial transparency regulations another
policy dead-end in regulators’ quest to control online speech.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I defines transparency as a
regulatory policy and then reviews the laws enacted in Florida and Texas. Part
II explains how mandatory editorial transparency would be unconstitutional if
imposed on traditional publishers and then explains why the same concerns
apply to online publishers of UGC. Part II also includes a case study showing
how regulators are already using editorial transparency enforcement to advance
their censorship. Part III evaluates some potential alternatives to validate
editorial transparency.
I. TRANSPARENCY AS A REGULATORY POLICY
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider have explained that “mandated
disclosure is ubiquitous. Innumerable federal and state statutes, municipal
ordinances, administrative regulations, and court rulings demand sometimes
marvelously elaborate disclosures from businesses.”8
Transparency laws have several perceived advantages over other
regulatory policies.9 First, transparency laws do not dictate a company’s choices
outright. Instead, the laws generate information that can help consumers make
better marketplace choices. For this reason, transparency requirements often
appeal to a wide range of constituents, including those who might be otherwise
skeptical of government regulation.10 Second, transparency laws can enable
advocates and regulators to hold companies accountable for the company’s
choices. In Justice Brandeis’ oft-cited words, “sunlight is the best
disinfectant.”11 Third, transparency laws can “nudge” a company’s choices by
increasing the company’s focus on disclosure12 and encouraging the company to
make choices that will be well-received when publicly disclosed.
8. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647,
650 (2011). See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW:
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014) (their associated book).
9. See MACCARTHY TAWG, supra note 6, at 7; TRANSATLANTIC WORKING GRP., FREEDOM AND
ACCOUNTABILITY: A TRANSATLANTIC FRAMEWORK FOR MODERATING SPEECH ONLINE 22 (2020),
https://cdn.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Freedom_and_Accountability_
TWG_Final_Report.pdf (“Transparency can achieve many aims simultaneously: enable governments to develop
evidence-based policies and strengthen their ability to exercise independent oversight; push firms to examine
issues or collect data that they otherwise would not; empower citizens to understand their information
environment.”).
10. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 8, at 5 (mandatory disclosures resonate with “free-market
principles” and the “autonomy principle”).
11. “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.” Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S
WKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10, https://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1910/1913_12_20_What_
Publicity_Ca.pdf.
12. See John Roberts, No One Is Perfect: The Limits of Transparency and an Ethic for ‘Intelligent’
Accountability, 34 ACCT., ORG. & SOC’Y 957, 958 (2009) (“[T]he effects of transparency depend on how it
changes conduct behind closed doors.”); FUNG ET AL., supra note 5, at 43 (“Businesses may be forced to establish
new systems of monitoring, measuring, review, and reporting . . . disclosures may change their practices in
response to new knowledge as well as to public pressure.”). As the cliché goes, “what gets measured gets done.”
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Finally, transparency laws can look like a bargain to regulators. Any
compliance costs incurred by the regulated companies do not impact regulators’
budgets,13 and regulators consider the costs as standard costs of doing business
(even when the costs raise entry barriers and increase consumer prices).
Furthermore, regulators are not required to set aside money for enforcement.14
Regulators may instead hope that the marketplace or competitors will do the
desired policing, or that any enforcement costs can be covered by existing
enforcement budgets.
In summary, transparency laws are routinely lauded as low-cost and “light
touch” regulatory tools compared to direct regulations.15 As Professors BenShahar and Schneider observed, “when lawmakers are besieged, mandated
disclosure looks like rescue. Its critics are few. Lawmakers can be seen to have
acted. The fisc is unmolested.”16
A. WHAT EDITORIAL TRANSPARENCY MEANS
This Article focuses on the policy approach of mandatory editorial
transparency, defined as requirements for publishers to disclose information
about their editorial operations and decisions. Mandatory editorial transparency
requirements can be structured in a virtually infinite number of ways,17 but at
minimum, the requirements must enumerate the information to disclose and
specify who gets it.
First, any editorial transparency law must specify what information the
publisher is required to disclose. Options include:
Disclosures of the publisher’s editorial policies, such as disclosures of an
Internet service’s “house rules”18 regarding how it handles “lawful-butSee What's Your Feed Reading Speed?, MATTHEW CORNELL: BLOG (July 30, 2007, 1:46 AM),
http://www.matthewcornell.org/blog/2007/7/30/whats-your-feed-reading-speed.html#1
(providing
an
etymology of this cliché).
13. Regulators often dismiss companies’ objections about the costs as self-interested representations. See
Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 8, at 682 (mandated disclosure regulation “looks cheap. It requires almost
no government expenditures, and its costs seem to be imposed on the story’s villain, the stronger party who
withholds information”).
14. Id.
15. FUNG ET AL., supra note 5, at 5 (“The ingeniousness of targeted transparency lies in its mobilization of
individual choice, market forces, and participatory democracy through relatively light-handed government
action.”); BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 8, at 5–6.
16. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 8, at 684.
17. MacCarthy categorized mandatory editorial transparency options as “platform rules,” “range of
enforcement techniques,” “complaint procedures,” “how platforms explain their decisions,” and “appeals
process”. MACCARTHY TAWG, supra note 6, at 18–19. Cf. FUNG ET AL., supra note 5, at 37–39 (required
disclosures can be warnings, “rights-to-know,” or targeted transparency). See generally Daphne Keller, Some
Humility About Transparency, STAN. L. SCH. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Mar. 19, 2021),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2021/03/some-humility-about-transparency (discussing the confusion about
what editorial transparency means and what disclosures advocates should favor).
18. Eric Goldman & Jess Miers, Online Account Terminations/Content Removals and the Benefits of
Internet Services Enforcing Their House Rules, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 191, 195 (2021). Synonyms for these
disclosures include: terms of service (TOS), terms of use (TOU), terms & conditions (T&Cs), acceptable use
policies (AUP), and community guidelines.
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objectionable” content19 or repeat copyright infringers.20 Regulators could also
require services to disclose their “algorithms” as codifications of their editorial
policies.
Explanations of the publisher’s decisions,21 such as an explanation of why
the publisher chose not to publish an author’s content.
Statistics about editorial decisions, such as the total number of content
items that an Internet service blocked or removed in a specified time period.
Spurred by civil society initiatives such as the Manila Principles (adopted in
2015)22 and the Santa Clara Principles (adopted in 201823 and updated in
202124), some Internet services voluntarily publish “transparency reports,”
compiling statistics about their editorial decisions and other activities.25 Some
examples: Google’s report on “right to be forgotten” requests;26 Facebook’s
transparency center;27 and Twitter’s statistics about law enforcement requests.28
Regulators have begun compelling publication of these statistics.29
19. Also called “lawful-but-awful” content. See Eric Goldman & Jess Miers, Why Can’t Internet
Companies Stop Awful Content?, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 27, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/11/
why-cant-internet-companies-stop-awful-content.
20. To qualify for the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) online safe harbor, Internet services
must “inform[] subscribers and account holders” of their policy towards repeat infringers. 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(i)(1)(A) (2020). Many services publish the disclosures to the general public, even though they could
provide it to a narrower audience. See Amanda Reid, Readability, Accessibility, and Clarity: An Analysis of
DMCA Repeat Infringer Policies, 61 JURIMETRICS J. 405, 412 (2021).
21. This is analogous to the GDPR’s “right of explanation.” Commission Regulation 2016/679, On the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data [2016] O.J. (L119/1) Recital 71; see Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained,
34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 204 (2019).
22. MANILA PRINCIPLES ON INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND 51 (2015),
https://www.eff.org/files/2015/07/08/manila_principles_background_paper.pdf (transparency reports should
include “information about all content restrictions taken by the intermediary, including actions taken on
government requests, court orders, private complainant requests, and enforcement of content restriction
policies”). The Manila Principles also call for disclosures of “content restriction policies” (Principle VI.c) and
public explanations of content restrictions (Principle VI.f). Id at 40–51.
23. See ACCESS NOW, ACLU FOUND. OF N. CALIF., ACLU FOUND. OF S. CALIF., ARTICLE 19, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST., CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., GLOB. PARTNERS DIGIT.,
INTERNETLAB, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST CENSORSHIP, NEW AMERICA’S OPEN TECH. INST., RANKING DIGIT. RTS.,
RED EN DEFENSA DE LOS DRECHOS DIGITALES & WITNESS, SANTA CLARA PRINCIPLES OPEN CONSULTATION
REPORT (2021), https://santaclaraprinciples.org/images/SantaClara_Report.pdf. Principle #1 says: “Companies
should publish the numbers of posts removed and accounts permanently or temporarily suspended due to
violations of their content guidelines.” Id at 7.
24. See id.
25. See MACCARTHY TAWG, supra note 6, at 11, 21.
26. Requests
to
Delist
Content
Under
European
Privacy
Law,
GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview?hl=en (last visited July 1, 2022).
27. Transparency Reports, FACEBOOK, https://transparency.fb.com/data/ (last visited July 1, 2022).
28. See, e.g., Twitter, Inc. v. Lynch, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Twitter, Inc. v. Holder,
183 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Twitter, Inc. v. Sessions, 263 F. Supp. 3d 803, 806 (N.D. Cal.
2017); Twitter, Inc. v. Barr, 445 F. Supp. 3d 295, 298 (N.D. Cal. 2020); see also Cathy Gellis, A Paean to
Transparency Reports, TECHDIRT (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200829/10223345205/
paean-to-transparency-reports.shtml.
29. See, e.g., Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken
[Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz] [NetzDG] [Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks], Sept.
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Disclosures of source data, such as the data that supported the publisher’s
editorial function. In the newsroom context, source data includes unpublished
journalistic material, such as a journalist’s research notes or source list. In the
Internet context, source data includes the corpus of third-party content submitted
for publication,30 including UGC items that have been withdrawn from
publication by the service or author, as well as items shared with limited
audiences (such as notes from private conversations).
Second, any editorial transparency law must specify who can access the
disclosed information. Disclosures can be published to the general public or to
smaller audiences, such as an explanation provided to an affected content
submitter, confidential filings with government agencies, or discovery in
litigation.
B. EXAMPLES OF EDITORIAL TRANSPARENCY LAWS: FLORIDA AND TEXAS
The “social media censorship” laws enacted by Florida31 and Texas32 are
actual examples of mandatory editorial transparency laws.33 Both laws
purportedly restrict “social media platforms” (that meet minimum-size
thresholds) from “censoring”34 their users. Both laws also require mandatory
editorial transparency.
Florida’s law requires social media platforms to publish their editorial
policies35 and provide individualized explanations to users who experience
adverse editorial decisions.36

1, 2017, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL I] at 3352, art. 1, § 2(1) (Ger.), translation at
https://www.bmj.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.pdf;jsessionid=22975E96
F887017497EB10566BFB78E0.1_cid297?__blob=publicationFile&v=2; MACCARTHY TAWG, supra note 6,
at 11 (discussing NetzDG). Regulators are also enacting mandatory disclosures about non-editorial activities.
See, e.g., Arkansas Online Marketplace Consumer Inform. Act, S. 470, 93th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark.
2021) (enacted) (online marketplaces must require marketplace vendors to disclose specified information in their
public listings).
30. This can include third-party content beyond UGC, such as ads. See, e.g., Ad Library, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/ (last visited July 1, 2022).
31. S. 7072, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2021) (enacted).
32. H.R. 20, 87th Leg., 2d Special Sess. (Tex. 2021) (enacted).
33. Florida and Texas outpaced Congress on this topic, but Congress has floated mandatory editorial
transparency bills as well. See, e.g., Platform Accountability and Transparency Act, S. 797, 117th Cong. (2021);
Eric Goldman, Comments on the “Platform Accountability and Consumer Transparency Act” (the “PACT
Act”), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (July 27, 2020), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/07/comments-onthe-platform-accountability-and-consumer-transparency-act-the-pact-act.htm.
34. The statutory references to “censorship” are deceptive because Internet services as private publishers
can never engage in “censorship”, while forcing Internet services to publish unwanted speech does constitute
government-dictated “censorship.”
35. Social media platforms must “publish the standards, including detailed definitions, it uses or has used
for determining how to censor, deplatform, and shadow ban.” FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(a) (2021).
36. When a social media platform “censors or shadow bans” a user’s content or deplatforms a user, it must
provide the user with “a thorough rationale explaining the reason that the social media platform censored the
user [and] a precise and thorough explanation of how the social media platform became aware of the censored
content or material, including a thorough explanation of the algorithms used, if any, to identify or flag the user’s
content or material as objectionable.” Id. § 501.2041(2)(d), (3).
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Like Florida, Texas’ law requires social media platforms to publish their
editorial policies (the law calls them “acceptable use policies”)37 and provide
explanations to users affected by those policies.38 However, Texas’ transparency
obligations go much further than Florida’s.
Texas also requires that social media platforms “publicly disclose accurate
information regarding its content management, data management, and business
practices.”39 This general requirement includes: “specific information regarding
the manner in which the social media platform: (1) curates and targets content
to users; (2) places and promotes content, services, and products, including its
own content, services, and products; (3) moderates content; (4) uses search,
ranking, or other algorithms or procedures that determine results on the platform;
and (5) provides users’ performance data on the use of the platform and its
products and services.”40
Texas also requires social media platforms to publish biannual
transparency reports containing the following statistics:41
•

(1) [T]he total number of instances in which the social media platform
was alerted to illegal content, illegal activity, or potentially policyviolating content by:

•

(A) user complaint;

•

(B) an employee of or person contracting with the social media platform;
or
(C) an internal automated detection tool;

•
•

(2) . . . the number of instances in which the social media platform took
action with respect to illegal content, illegal activity, or potentially
policy-violating content known to the platform due to the nature of the
content as illegal content, illegal activity, or potentially policy-violating
content, including:
o

(A) content removal;

o
o

(B) content demonetization;
(C) content deprioritization;

o

(D) the addition of an assessment to content;

37. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 120.052 (West 2021).
38. Id. § 120.103(a)(1).
39. Id. § 120.051(a).
40. Id. The law also amorphously requires that these disclosures “be sufficient to enable users to make an
informed choice regarding the purchase of or use of access to or services from the platform.” Id. § 120.051(b).
41. This overreaching list of disclosures is not unusual:
Mandated disclosure’s appeal to lawmakers and the allure of the more-is-better mantra lead
lawmakers to mandate disclosure too often and too broadly. . . . Only broad disclosure
accommodates the variety of discloses and circumstances. One can always imagine that disclosing
one more datum might help. Because it is hard to anticipate what data will help, safety seems to lie
in broad mandates. . . . Lawmakers might set a mandate’s scope by asking consumers what they want
to know. Alas, they say virtually everything.
Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 8, at 684–85.
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(E) account suspension;

(F) account removal; or
(G) any other action taken in accordance with the platform’s
acceptable use policy;
(3) the country of the user who provided the content for each instance
described by Subdivision (2);
o
o

•
•
•

(4) the number of coordinated campaigns, if applicable;
(5) the number of instances in which a user appealed the decision to
remove the user’s potentially policy-violating content;

•

(6) the percentage of appeals described by Subdivision (5) that resulted
in the restoration of content; and
(7) a description of each tool, practice, action, or technique used in
enforcing the acceptable use policy.42

•

Collectively, Texas explicitly adopted three of the four different
information disclosure categories outlined in Part I(A): disclosures of editorial
policies, explanations of editorial decisions, and statistics of editorial
decisions/operations.
Texas’ law will also inevitably require social media platforms to disclose
source data, even though that requirement is stated only implicitly. That’s
because social media platforms will misreport or provide erroneous reports
(intentionally or not),43 and regulators cannot guilelessly accept the selfreports.44 To double-check the accuracy of any disclosures, regulators will need
access to the source data.45
For example, consider how Texas would verify a social media platform’s
disclosure of “the number of instances in which the social media platform took
action with respect to illegal content, illegal activity, or potentially policyviolating content known to the platform due to the nature of the content as illegal
42. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 120.053 (West 2021).
43. Some reasons why social media platforms may underreport or misreport: they may underinvest in their
reporting systems; they may skew any judgment calls in how they characterize data or otherwise make selfbeneficial interpretations of the legal requirements; they may avoid disclosing any information that might
constitute a trade secret or help gamers; they may resist confirming they violated a law; and they may suppress
any information that conflicts with their public narratives. On the latter point, see, e.g., Davey Alba & Ryan
Mac, Facebook, Fearing Public Outcry, Shelved Earlier Report on Popular Posts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/20/technology/facebook-popular-posts.html. See generally FUNG ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 72–73 (discussing ways to game disclosure requirements); Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note
8, at 698–702 (explaining why companies shirk mandatory disclosure obligations).
44. Cf. FUNG ET AL., supra note 5, at 45 (“targeted transparency policies do not work unless they are
enforced…the government must develop methods to monitor compliance with disclosure requirements”).
45. Mark MacCarthy, A Consumer Protection Approach to Platform Content Moderation, in
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION ONLINE: THE FUTURE REGULATION OF INTERMEDIARIES 115, 134 (Bilyana
Petkova & Tuomas Ojanen eds., 2019) (“The only way to determine whether the program functions effectively
in terms of its output is to examine the content judgments of the platforms and second guess whether they were
in accordance with the platforms announced content rules.”). Regulators could use sampling techniques, but that
wouldn’t solve any constitutional infirmity with respect to the sample. Part III will explore other possible policy
alternatives.
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content, illegal activity, or potentially policy-violating content.”46 The regulator
would need access to the service’s entire database corpus—including any
deleted content—to make its own independent calculations.
A similar dynamic occurs with disclosures of “acceptable use policies.”47
A social media platform can easily disclose many of its codified written policies
(though doing so may expose trade secrets or enable malicious users).48
However, services may have unwritten policies or policies hastily adopted onthe-spot in response to exigencies and unforeseeable circumstances.49 Plus,
publishers routinely and intentionally make exceptions to their editorial
policies50—it’s called editorial discretion, after all—and sometimes make
editorial judgments they later acknowledge as mistakes.51 To confirm that the
service actually follows its published policies, or to discover undisclosed
policies, a regulator will need access to the entire database corpus (including
deleted content) to identify anomalies or unusual patterns that reflect
undisclosed policies.52
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EDITORIAL TRANSPARENCY
This Part has three subparts. The first subpart shows how and why
mandatory editorial transparency would be unconstitutional if imposed on

46. TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 120.053(2) (West 2021).
47. The analysis is possibly different with respect to algorithms that encode editorial decisions because, in
theory, those algorithms can be evaluated solely by inspection of the code. Algorithm disclosures are
nevertheless problematic, even without any associated source-data disclosure, because of the chilling effects of
government review of editorial decisions discussed in Part II(A)(1). The disclosures also raise significant trade
secret concerns.
48. See Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief on Appeal, Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton, No. 21-15869 (9th Cir. July
16, 2021) [hereinafter Twitter Appellate Brief]. Non-Internet publishers may also prefer not to disclose their
editorial policies because defamation plaintiffs may adversely cite their policies to show “actual malice.” See
Erik Wemple, CNN Fights to Keep Internal Editorial Guidelines Under Wraps. Why?, WASH. POST (May 7,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2018/05/07/cnn-fights-to-keep-internaleditorial-guidelines-under-wraps-why/ (CNN, “CBS News, ABC News and Fox News keep their own guidelines
under wraps”).
49. This highlights the perniciousness of Florida allowing social media platforms to amend their editorial
policies only once every thirty days. It assumes the platforms can articulate every possible editorial policy in
advance before they’ve seen the full corpus of content needing curation.
50. As the maxim goes, “rules are made to be broken.”
51. There are countless examples of traditional publishers admitting they made publication decisions that,
in retrospect, “did not meet their editorial standards.” See, e.g., Helen Pidd, BBC Says Interview with Epstein
Lawyer Did Not Meet Its Standards, GUARDIAN (Dec. 30, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/
dec/30/bbc-says-interview-with-epstein-lawyer-alan-dershowitz-did-not-meet-its-standards; Maanvi Singh,
New York Times Says Senator Tom Cotton’s Op-ed Did Not Meet Editorial Standards, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/jun/05/new-york-times-says-tom-cotton-opinion-piece-did-notmeet-editorial-standards; Editor’s Note, CNN POLS. (June 23, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/23/
politics/editors-note/index.html (a CNN story “did not meet CNN’s editorial standards and has been retracted”).
Florida and Texas bills would punish social media platforms for making similar “mistakes” as deviations from
stated editorial policies, even though traditional publishers rarely face liability for non-defamatory deviations
from their “editorial standards.”
52. Individual anecdotes also could be used as inculpatory evidence, but those anecdotes may not be
enough to establish that a platform had undisclosed policies.
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traditional publishers, such as print newspapers. The second subpart shows why
those constitutional principles extend to Internet services publishing UGC and
other third-party content. The third subpart uses a case study to illustrate how
editorial transparency obligations enable illegitimate enforcement actions.
A. MANDATORY PUBLISHER TRANSPARENCY
1. Constitutional Limits on Publisher Transparency
The Florida and Texas laws appear to break new ground in regulating
publishers. My research did not identify any pre-Internet laws that imposed
mandatory editorial transparency on traditional publishers.53 As a result, prior to
the cases discussed below, I am not aware of any associated lawsuits analyzing
the First Amendment implications of mandatory editorial transparency.
However, the law has addressed the partially analogous situation of generating
evidence about a publisher’s editorial decision-making process.
As a starting point, the Constitution limits the compelled disclosure of
traditional publishers’ source data. For example, the execution of search
warrants against publishers raises heightened concerns because law enforcement
could indiscriminately grab source data they are not entitled to have.54
Emphasizing this concern, Congress enacted the Privacy Protection Act of
198055 to impose additional restrictions on search warrants directed towards
individuals disseminating “public communications.”56
These concerns are partly ameliorated with respect to other investigatory
and discovery methods, where a judge can supervise the requests before
disclosure. Still, investigations, or discovery into publishers’ decisions or
operations, create significant constitutional concerns.57
53. For example, “the government does not require [newspaper] editorial boards to have and disclose the
standards they use for their decisions about what to publish and what not to publish.” MacCarthy, supra note 45,
at 21.
54. 3 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 25:36 (2021) (explaining how
search warrants are more intrusive to newsroom operations than subpoenas because it’s harder for the publisher
to protect its various interests when the data gathering is so invasive). However, the Constitution does not
categorically restrict the execution of search warrants in newsrooms. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547,
567 (1978) (“[W]e decline to reinterpret the Amendment to impose a general constitutional barrier against
warrants to search newspaper premises, to require resort to subpoenas as a general rule, or to demand prior notice
and hearing in connection with the issuance of search warrants.”).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
56. Id. The Department of Justice also restricts its evidence-gathering with respect to publishers. 28 C.F.R.
§ 50.10 (detailing restrictions on the DOJ’s issuance of subpoenas to news media entities); see also
Memorandum from the Att’y Gen. to the Deputy Att’y Gen., the Assoc. Att’y Gen., Heads of Dep’ts
Components, U.S. Att’ys & Fed. Prosecutors on the Subject of the Use of Compulsory Process to Obtain
Information From, or Records of, Members of the News Media 1 (July 19, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/
ag/page/file/1413001/download (adopting further restrictions on the DOJ’s use of “compulsory legal process for
the purpose of obtaining information from or records of members of the news media acting within the scope of
newsgathering activities”).
57. Cf. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (“The compelled production of a
reporter’s resource materials can constitute a significant intrusion into the newsgathering and editorial
processes.”).
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The 1979 Supreme Court opinion Herbert v. Lando58 explored the
boundaries of these issues. The plaintiff, a public figure, sued the television
show 60 Minutes for defamation.59 The defendants claimed they lacked actual
malice about the allegedly defamatory statements, an absolute defense to the
defamation claim.60 To assess the legitimacy of the actual malice defense, the
plaintiff propounded interrogatories that essentially demanded an explanation
for the show’s publication decision.61 The defense declined to answer the
interrogatories because it claimed “the First Amendment protected against
inquiry into the state of mind of those who edit, produce, or publish, and into the
editorial process.”62
Herbert’s majority opinion rejected the defense’s position and required the
defense to provide the requested explanations.63 The majority explained that
“unless liability is to be completely foreclosed, the thoughts and editorial
processes of the alleged defamer would be open to examination.”64
The majority placed several qualifications on this authorization of
discovery. First, the plaintiff sued for defamation predicated on the defense’s
allegedly false statements.65 The Court notes that “if inquiry into editorial
conclusions threatens the suppression not only of information known or strongly
suspected to be unreliable, but also of truthful information, the issue would be
quite different.”66 Second, the majority says that discovery into editorial
processes should be rare (“in the tiny percentage of instances in which error is
claimed and litigation ensues”), not commonplace.67 Third, the majority
emphasized that “the requirement of Rule 26(b)(1) that the material sought in
discovery be ‘relevant’ should be firmly applied.”68
The majority’s qualifications already project some problems with
mandatory editorial transparency requirements, especially as Florida and Texas
imposed them. Their mandatory explanation obligations do not apply only to the
“tiny percentage” of circumstances where defendants are accused of defamation;
the laws instead categorically require explanations of potentially billions of
decisions each day, regardless of a service’s truthfulness. Furthermore, other
58. 441 U.S. 153, 153 (1979).
59. Id.
60. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285–86 (1964); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 166 (1967).
61. Lando, 441 U.S. at 157.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 155.
64. Id. at 160.
65. Id. at 156.
66. Id. at 172.
67. Id. at 174.
68. Id. at 177. Despite this qualification about relevancy, the majority seemed unconcerned with the
volume of discovery in the case: “Lando’s deposition alone continued intermittently for over a year, and filled
26 volumes containing nearly 3,000 pages and 240 exhibits. As well as out-of-pocket expenses of the deposition,
there were substantial legal fees, and Lando and his associates were diverted from newsgathering and reporting
for a significant amount of time.” Id. at n.25.
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transparency requirements, including the disclosures of editorial policies and
statistics, are broad-based and burdensome,69 not the kind of contextually
tailored information disclosures the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires.70
The Herbert majority added this crucial qualification: “[t]here is no law
that subjects the editorial process to private or official examination merely to
satisfy curiosity or to serve some general end such as the public interest; and if
there were, it would not survive constitutional scrutiny as the First Amendment
is presently construed.”71
This passage anticipated the moves Florida and Texas would make over
four decades later. Both states mandated editorial transparency categorically, not
in response to a specific legal violation (such as defamation). Thus, the
disclosures are required without a plaintiff showing a prima facie case of legal
value, without a plaintiff justifying the need for discovery, and without any
judicial oversight of the disclosure’s appropriateness. In other words, both laws
require the disclosures “to satisfy curiosity or to serve some general end such as
the public interest”72—exactly what Herbert said legislatures could not do.
A 2019 Fourth Circuit case, Washington Post v. McManus,73 was even
more emphatic than Herbert v. Lando about the constitutional problems of
mandatory source-data disclosures.74 The McManus case involved Maryland’s
Online Electioneering Transparency and Accountability Act, enacted in 2018 in
response to allegations of foreign interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election.75
Maryland’s law imposed two new obligations on “online platforms.”76
First, it required platforms to publish specified source data:
[W]ithin 48 hours of an ad being purchased, platforms must display
somewhere on their site the identity of the purchaser, the individuals
exercising control over the purchaser, and the total amount paid for the ad.

69. For example:
If the parties to any lawsuit were free to subpoena the press at will, it would likely become standard
operating procedure for those litigating against an entity that had been the subject of press attention
to sift through press files in search of information supporting their claims. The resulting wholesale
exposure of press files to litigant scrutiny would burden the press with heavy costs of subpoena
compliance, and could otherwise impair its ability to perform its duties…permitting litigants
unrestricted, court-enforced access to journalistic resources would risk the symbolic harm of making
journalists appear to be an investigative arm of the judicial system, the government, or private parties.
Gonzales v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 194 F.3d 29, 34–35 (2d Cir. 1998).
70. See Lando, 441 U.S. at 177.
71. Id. at 174.
72. The Texas law enumerates “the public interest” as one of its purported justifications. H.R. 20, 87th
Leg., 2d Special Sess. § 1(3) (Tex. 2021) (enacted) (“[S]ocial media platforms…are affected with a public
interest.”).
73. 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019).
74. However, the McManus opinion did not cite Herbert.
75. McManus, 944 F.3d at 510.
76. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 1-101(dd-1) (West 2021).
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They must keep that information online for at least a year following the
relevant election.77

Second, it required that platforms collect and make source data available
to regulators for inspection: “platforms must collect records concerning their
political ad purchasers and retain those records for at least a year after the
election so that the Maryland Board of Elections can review them upon
request.”78
The court called the law “a compendium of traditional First Amendment
infirmities,”79 especially the law’s inspection right given its source-data
disclosure implications:
Not only does it compel the Publishers to turn over information to state
regulators, it also brings the state into an unhealthy entanglement with news
outlets. The core problem with this provision of the Act is that it lacks any
readily discernable limits on the ability of government to supervise the
operations of the newsroom. As it stands now, the Act requires news outlets
to provide Maryland with no less than six separate disclosures, each assertedly
justified by the state’s interests in informing the electorate and enforcing its
campaign finance laws. But with its foot now in the door, Maryland has
offered no rationale for where these incursions might end . . . . Without clear
limits, the specter of a broad inspection authority, coupled with an expanded
disclosure obligation, can chill speech and is a form of state power the
Supreme Court would not countenance.80

The “unhealthy entanglements” are an inevitable consequence of every
mandatory editorial transparency law where enforcement requires regulator
access to source-data disclosure,81 whether or not the law expressly calls out
source-data disclosure (which the Maryland law did). The inevitability of these
adverse speech consequences and how they prospectively change publishers’
editorial choices, should support facial constitutional challenges, rather than
requiring publishers to raise as-applied challenges post-enforcement.
Though mandatory explanations of editorial decisions may not require
source-data disclosure, they are still problematic because they require publishers
to detail their editorial thought process. The prospect of having to explain
decisions inevitably causes publishers to steer their editorial decisions towards
what provides the most defensible explanation, not necessarily what is best for

77. McManus, 944 F.3d at 511–12.
78. Id. at 512.
79. Id. at 513.
80. Id. at 518–19; see also Comm.-Serv. Broad. of Mid-Am., Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1103, 1110 (1978)
(striking down a law requiring some broadcasters to record the programs they broadcast and make those
recordings available on request). Similar election ad-related disclosure rules applicable to broadcasters may be
Constitutional, which reflects the reduced Constitutional protection that broadcasters receive compared to other
media. See generally Reno v. Am. C.L. Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
81. Courts have routinely acknowledged that government investigations can chill the investigated party’s
First Amendment rights. See, e.g., White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000).

July 2022

MANDATING EDITORIAL TRANSPARENCY

1217

their audience.82 In Herbert, the Supreme Court tolerated this risk of decisionmaking distortion if it would lead to reduced publication of unconstitutional
content (defamatory material). In contrast, categorical and indiscriminate
explanation obligations affect the editorial decision-making process for both
unconstitutional and constitutionally-protected content, and the distortion of the
latter creates intolerable outcomes under both Herbert and McManus.
In summary, mandatory editorial transparency restrictions affect the
substance of the published content, similar to the effects of outright speech
restrictions. This indicates that the laws should be categorized as content-based
restrictions and trigger strict scrutiny.83 If strict scrutiny applies, mandatory
editorial transparency laws will routinely fail any constitutional challenge—
especially given that transparency laws routinely do not effectively advance their
goals.84
2. Additional Concerns About Compelled Speech
The prior section explained how mandatory editorial transparency conflicts
with the First Amendment by creating unhealthy entanglements between the
government and publishers, which in turn distort and chill speech. This makes
such laws a straightforward speech restriction.
Mandatory editorial transparency laws also should qualify as “compelled
speech.” For example, in the McManus case, the Fourth Circuit said: “the Act’s
publication and inspection requirements ultimately present compelled speech
problems twice over . . . [and] forces news publishers to speak in a way they
would not otherwise.”85
The First Amendment limits the ability of governments to compel speech.
As Chief Justice Roberts has indicated, “freedom of speech prohibits the
government from telling people what they must say.”86 This principle applies
most strongly when the government literally puts words in citizens’ mouths; but

82. See Comm.-Serv. Broad. of Mid-Am., 593 F.2d at 1115 (declaring a mandatory source-data disclosure
law unconstitutional because it facilitates regulators’ exercise of their “power and persuasion which create the
chill”). “In seeking to identify the chilling effect of a statute our ultimate concern is not so much with what
government officials will actually do, but with how reasonable broadcasters will perceive regulation, and with
the likelihood they will censor themselves to avoid official pressure and regulation.” Id. at 1117.
83. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 156 (2015).
84. Fung et al. explain:
Targeted policies were effective only when they provided facts that people wanted in times, places,
and ways that enabled them to act. . . . the starting point for any transparency policy was an
understanding of the priorities and capacities of diverse audiences who might use the information.
FUNG ET AL., supra note 5, at xiv. Broad-based and categorical editorial transparency requirements are unlikely
to reflect any “understanding of the priorities and capacities” of the information consumers who should benefit
from them. Worse, when miscalibrated, “transparency policies can do more harm than good.” Id. at 90.
85. Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 514 (4th Cir. 2019).
86. Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Inst. Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 58 (2006); see also Nat’l Inst. of Family &
Life Advoc. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S.
781, 796–97 (1988).
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it can also apply when the government forces someone to speak when they
would prefer not to speak.
Yet, it is not clear how the compelled speech doctrine applies to mandatory
editorial transparency laws.87 As Professor Eugene Volokh lamented, the
doctrine’s “details are often hard to pin down” and the cases “seem hard to
wrestle into a fully coherent pattern.”88
The McManus court relied on the compelled speech doctrine to strike down
Maryland’s ad disclosure law, saying “the integrity of these expressive
commodities is presumptively at risk as soon as the government compels any
alteration to their message.”89 Thus, the compelled speech doctrine could
provide another reason to strictly scrutinize any mandatory editorial
transparency laws.90 Alternatively, courts could appropriately apply strict
scrutiny due to the speech distortion/unhealthy entanglements concerns, without
reaching the compelled speech doctrine at all. Another possibility is that the
compelled speech analysis could merge into the speech restriction analysis
because both doctrines recognize the same speech harms (that is, the chilling
effects and distorted speech decisions).91
3. Distinguishing Editorial Transparency Laws from Other Mandatory
Disclosures
This section explains why the widespread prevalence of transparency laws
does not confirm the validity of mandatory editorial transparency laws.
As a starting point, publishers must comply with laws that apply to
businesses generally.92 For example, publishers must comply with employment
laws and tax laws just as other businesses do.93 In the same vein, publishers must
comply with many generally applicable mandatory disclosure laws. For
example, publicly-listed publishers must file disclosures with the Securities &
Exchange Commission consistent with securities laws; publishers must file

87. See generally CRS REPORT, supra note 7.
88. Eugene Volokh, Essay, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355, 356, 392 (2018).
89. McManus, 944 F.3d at 514.
90. See Berin Szoka & Ashkhen Kazaryan, Section 230: An Introduction for Antitrust & Consumer
Protection Practitioners, 3 GLOB. ANTITRUST INST. REP. DIGIT. ECON. 1059, 1101–03, 1109 (2020),
https://gaidigitalreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Szo%CC%81ka-Kazaryan-Section-230.pdf
(discussing the compelled speech problems with mandatory editorial transparency). Cf. Am. for Prosperity
Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 742 (2021) (in a compelled speech case, requiring that the government show the law
is “narrowly tailored”).
91. As Professor Volokh summarized, “[s]peech compulsions, the Court has often held, are as
constitutionally suspect as are speech restrictions.” Volokh, supra note 88, at 355.
92. The “First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from
the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability.” Brandzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682
(1972).
93. However, a general-purpose regulation (such as a tax law) may nevertheless create Constitutional
problems when imposed on publishers with censorial effects. See, e.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
244 (1936); Minn. Star Trib. Co. v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983).
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income tax forms; and publishers must file reports about their lobbying
activities.94
When a general disclosure law prompts a company to change its behavior
(which sometimes is the legislature’s hope or intent), those changes do not
necessarily impact the company’s speech outputs. For example, if a foodlabeling law induces a food manufacturer to modify the amount of saturated fat
or sugar in its product, the product change did not affect the manufacturer’s
freedom of speech.95 In contrast, if an editorial transparency law causes a
publisher to change its editorial practices, then the law has speech effects that
are absent in ordinary product configuration decisions. Indeed, the legislature
may expressly intend for the mandatory editorial transparency law to motivate
the publisher to change its speech.96
Furthermore, with general disclosure obligations, regulators can confirm
the disclosures’ accuracy without reviewing editorial-related source data. For
example, determining the accuracy of a publisher’s securities filing or tax return
should not require investigating the publisher’s editorial decision-making
process.97 In contrast, validating editorial disclosures necessarily requires
regulatory scrutiny of editorial decisions, with the associated unwanted effects
on the publisher’s speech.
Finally, imposing transparency obligations on publishers of third-party
speech is distinguishable from imposing the same disclosure obligations on the
first-party speakers. In the context of campaign finance disclosures, the
McManus court explained how mandatory editorial transparency economically
distorts publishers’ editorial decisions:
Disclosure obligations applied to neutral third-party platforms are thus, from
a First Amendment perspective, different in kind from conventional campaign
finance regulations. First, platform-based campaign finance regulations like
the one here make it financially irrational, generally speaking, for platforms
to carry political speech when other, more profitable options are available.
Second, platform-based campaign finance regulations create freestanding
legal liabilities and compliance burdens that independently deter hosting
political speech. For example, to avoid the Act’s various sanctions . . . the
Publishers here have claimed that they would have to acquire new software
for data collection; publish additional web pages; and disclose proprietary
pricing models . . . . Faced with this headache, there is good reason to suspect
many platforms would simply conclude: Why bother?98

94. S.E.C. v. McGoff, 647 F.2d 185, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“The Supreme Court has consistently rejected
claims that the press is shielded by the Constitution against laws of general applicability . . .”).
95. CRS REPORT, supra note 7, at 31.
96. The history of Florida’s and Texas’s laws are filled with pro-censorship statements by proponents. See
generally NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, 546 F. Supp. 3d 1082 (N.D. Fla. 2021); NetChoice, Inc. v. Paxton, 2021
WL 5755120 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2021).
97. Cf. McGoff, 647 F.2d at 191 (an SEC subpoena could not reach materials related to “editorial policy”
or newsgathering).
98. Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 2019).
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Considering these differences, it’s a false equivalency to characterize
mandatory editorial transparency as just another business compliance cost or the
same as general disclosure laws. General disclosure laws may be constitutional,
even as applied to publishers, and yet mandatory editorial transparency laws may
not be.
B. EXTENDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR PUBLISHERS TO
SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS
The prior subpart explained why mandatory editorial transparency laws
likely trigger strict scrutiny when imposed on traditional publishers. This subpart
now shows how the same result occurs when those obligations are imposed on
Internet services that publish third-party content, including the “social media
platforms” targeted by Florida and Texas.
This doctrinal extension should be rather straightforward.99 The First
Amendment protects publication decisions. Like traditional publishers, Internet
services publish third-party content.100 As a California federal district court
opinion explained, “Like a newspaper or a news network, Twitter makes
decisions about what content to include, exclude, moderate, filter, label, restrict,
or promote, and those decisions are protected by the First Amendment.”101 No
further analysis should be required.
Yet, regulators and commentators have undertaken remarkable efforts to
identify some legal basis that would override this simple and intuitive principle
in favor of a counterintuitive conclusion that Internet services that publish thirdparty content deserve less constitutional protection than traditional publishers.
These workaround proposals have included arguments that:
• social media platforms are common carriers;102

99. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Do Platforms Have Editorial Rights?, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 97, 117 (2021)
(“[I]t seems unexceptional that social media platforms are entitled to First Amendment editorial rights.”).
100. For example, a publisher’s editorial judgment includes “republishing and highlighting” articles—
exactly what Internet services do with third-party content. See Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1087 (9th
Cir. 1972).
101. O’Handley v. Padilla, 2022 WL 93625, at *41 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2022).
In proceedings before the Federal Election Commission, several commissioners characterized Twitter
as a “press entity” or “media entity.” In the Matter of Twitter, Inc., MURs 7821, 7827 & 7868, FED. ELEC.
COMM’N, Sept. 13, 2021, https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7827/7827_14.pdf (Supplemental Statement of
Reasons of Vice Chair Allen Dickerson & Commissioner James E. “Trey” Trainor, III); id.
https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7827/7827_13.pdf (Statement of Reasons of Commissioner Sean J.
Cooksey).
102. Social Media Platforms, Fla. S.B. 7072 § 1(6) (“Social media platforms…should be treated similarly
to common carriers”); Tex. H.B. 20 § 1(3) (“social media platforms function as common carriers”); id. § 1(4)
(“social media platforms with the largest number of users are common carriers by virtue of their market
dominance”); see also Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 3, State of Ohio ex rel Yost
v. Google LLC, 21 CV H 06 0274 (Ohio C.P. Ct. June 8, 2021), https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Files/
Briefing-Room/News-Releases/Filed-Complaint-(Time-Stamped).aspx
[hereinafter
Ohio
Complaint]
(“Google’s provision of internet search is properly classified as a common carrier . . . under Ohio common
law.”).
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•
•

social media platforms are utilities;103
social media platforms are public forums or public squares,104 or
the modern-day equivalent of these government-operated public
spaces, and, thus, state actors; and
• social media platforms have publicly claimed that they are one
of the foregoing entities, so the Constitution should treat them as
such.105
If any workaround argument succeeds, the door would open for regulatory
interventions beyond just mandatory editorial transparency. Regulators would
be able to impose regulations on “social media platforms” that the Constitution
would not permit for traditional publishers—and regulators would
enthusiastically embrace this power to dictate virtually every aspect of Internet
services. As a result, the legal review of mandatory editorial transparency is a
microcosm in the broader regulatory push for unrestricted Internet censorship.
As an exemplar of why some advocates think social media platforms
warrant less constitutional protection than traditional publishers like
newspapers,106 this Article will evaluate the justifications proffered by the
Knight First Amendment Institute’s amicus brief107 regarding Florida’s social
media censorship law.108
First, the brief argued that newspapers publish mostly “content they
themselves create or specifically solicit,” while social media content mostly “is
generated by the platforms’ users.”109 This argument is flawed both legally and
factually. Legally, it’s unclear why First Amendment protections should vary
based on how the publisher sourced the published content (that is, “specifically
solicited” third-party content somehow deserves greater protection than other
third-party content). Factually, social media platforms do “solicit” the thirdparty content they publish (it’s their raison d’être); while traditional publishers
103. Fla. S.B. 7072 § 1(5) (“Social media platforms have become as important for conveying public opinion
as public utilities are for supporting modern society”); see also Ohio Complaint, supra note 102, at 3 (“Google’s
provision of internet search is properly classified as a . . . public utility under Ohio common law.”).
104. Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2020); Tex. H.B. 20 § 1(3) (“[S]ocial media
platforms . . . are central public forums for public debate . . .”).
105. Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 999.
106. A comparison between the publication activities of social media platforms and newspapers is
necessarily incomplete because a wide diversity of other publishers receive vigorous First Amendment
protections. See, e.g., Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993) (book author qualified for the same
treatment as other journalists because “what makes journalism journalism is not its format but its contents”); see
also von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987) (the press’s “intended manner of dissemination
may be by newspaper, magazine, book, public or private broadcast medium, handbill or the like”).
107. Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University Supporting
Plaintiffs-Appellees, NetChoice LLC v. Att’y Gen. of Fl., No. 21-12355 (11th Cir. Nov. 15, 2021),
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3585&context=historical [hereinafter KFAI
Brief]. The brief nominally opposed the Florida law, but its arguments sought to show how states could impose
mandatory editorial transparency on social media platforms—which is what Florida was defending in court.
108. The KFAI Brief was filed in the Eleventh Circuit appeal of NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, 546 F.Supp.3d
1082 (N.D. Fla. 2021).
109. KFAI Brief, supra note 107, at 19.
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can, and often do, publish unsolicited third-party content, including readergenerated content110 and other content from third-party sources.111
Second, the brief argued that “there is an incredible disparity in scale
between newspapers and social media platforms.”112 This argument points
towards the need for greater, not lesser, constitutional protections for social
media platforms. After all, government censorship causes greater harm when
imposed on a bigger scale; and the burden of editorial transparency compliance
increases when imposed on social media platforms operating at scale.113 For
example, a newspaper would struggle to explain its dozens of daily publication
decisions; it will be exponentially harder for social media platforms to explain
potentially billions of daily publication decisions.114
Third, the brief argued that “newspapers are coherent speech products in a
way that social media platforms are not.”115 The Supreme Court has not adopted
the term “coherent speech products,”116 and it may not be a constitutionally
recognized concept.117 Furthermore, the brief does not adequately appreciate
how platforms use their idiosyncratic “house rules” to curate content that meets
their audiences’ needs.118

110. For example, a letterzine is “a fanzine in which the contents consist primarily or entirely of letters
submitted by the readers.” Letterzine, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE FICTION (2006).
111. For example, early American newspapers routinely republished third-party content without obtaining
permission. See, e.g., Nicholas Marshall, The Rural Newspaper and the Circulation of Information and Culture
in New York and the Antebellum North, 88 N.Y. HIST. 133, 140 (2007):
Nearly one half of the paper [the Freeman’s Journal] was simply reprinted from papers exchanged
around the country, and this figure severely underrepresents the actual practice, since it only accounts
for attributed reprints. The editor many times simply summarized pieces gleaned from outside
sources, without attribution, a common and perfectly legal practice. Editors had responsibility for
much of the operations of the paper and could not be expected to produce much original copy. The
figure for local news, 8 percent, probably closely approximates the extent of their own writing.
See generally WILL SLAUTER, WHO OWNS THE NEWS? (2019) (discussing how early newspaper editors viewed
their role as principally curatorial).
112. KFAI Brief, supra note 107, at 19.
113. See NetChoice, Inc. v. Paxton, 2021 WL 5755120, at *36 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2021) (Texas’ mandatory
editorial obligations “are inordinately burdensome given the unfathomably large numbers of posts on these sites
and apps”).
114. Cf. MALENA DAILEY, NETCHOICE, BY THE NUMBERS: WHAT CONTENT SOCIAL MEDIA REMOVES AND
WHY (2021) https://netchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Content-Moderation-By-The-Numbers-v5.pdf.
115. KFAI Brief, supra note 107, at 20.
116. The term comes from Volokh, supra note 88, at 358.
117. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae, The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press et al., in Support of
Appellees and Affirmance, at 22, NetChoice LLC v. Att’y Gen. of Fl., No. 21-12355, (11th Cir. filed Nov. 15,
2021), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3587&context=historical (the phrase is
“incoherent, unworkable, and lacks any limiting principle to cabin its scope”).
118. Twitter Appellate Brief, supra note 48, at 9, 34 (“Twitter’s moderation policies and procedures are
functionally equivalent to the internal editorial decision-making processes of news organizations….just like a
newspaper editor or bookstore owner, Twitter makes decisions about what content to disseminate or not
disseminate through its platform.”); see O’Handley v. Padilla, 2022 WL 93625, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2022)
(“a Twitter user encountering O’Handley’s tweets would indeed think that Twitter is the kind of place that allows
such tweets on its platform. A user who encountered enough such tweets might think that Twitter was content
to be complicit in spreading election misinformation”); see also Goldman & Miers, supra note 18, at 195.
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Fourth, the brief argued that “newspapers generally do not remove content
once it has been published, whereas removing content after publication is a
major part of social media platforms’ operations.”119 Consistent with the laws of
physics, it is true that newspapers cannot remove content from already-printed
editions. However, newspapers increasingly remove online content,120 so the
brief may factually overstate the divergence in practice. Plus, the fact that social
media platforms have the ability to depublish/unpublish content heightens, not
lessens, the constitutional concerns with regulator demands to pressure social
media platforms to stop publishing the content. Furthermore, while newspapers
and social media platforms may primarily exercise their editorial discretion at
different stages in the publication process (newspapers at selection, social media
platforms at removal), this timing difference does not override that each entity
still makes those decisions using its editorial judgments.
Fifth, the brief argued that platforms’ use of algorithmic content
moderation and machine learning means that “newspapers’ decisions are
explainable in a way that platforms’ decisions often are not.”121 So long as the
judgment reflects the publisher’s editorial decision, it’s unclear why this
distinction matters. Plus, human editors of all types routinely make intuitive
decisions that can be hard to explain (at least in any understandable way) and,
as discussed in Part I.B, cannot be logically squared with prior decisions.
Despite its efforts, the Knight First Amendment Institute’s arguments do
not provide a sound justification for giving newspapers greater First Amendment
protection than social media platforms. And shortly after it was filed, a judge
implicitly but emphatically rejected its arguments as well as the arguments of
other proponents of social media exceptionalism.122 In NetChoice v. Paxton, the
district court addressed the question of “whether social media platforms exercise
editorial discretion or occupy a purgatory between common carrier and
editor”123 and concluded:

119. KFAI Brief, supra note 107, at 21.
120. See, e.g., Claire Miller & David Folkenflik, From Cleveland to Boston, Newsrooms Revisit Old Stories
to Offer a ‘Fresh Start,’ NPR (Feb. 23, 2021, 4:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/23/970239121/
from-cleveland-to-boston-newsrooms-revisit-old-stories-to-offer-a-fresh-start;
KATHY
ENGLISH,
THE
LONGTAIL OF NEWS: TO UNPUBLISH OR NOT TO UNPUBLISH 4, 6 (2009), http://www.journalismproject.ca/sites/
www.j-source.ca/files/attachments/Long%20Tail%20report_Kathy_English.pdf (78% of newspaper editors
believe that news organizations should sometimes unpublish online articles); Aaron Minc, How to Permanently
Remove Unwanted Newspaper Articles From the Internet, MINC LAW, https://www.minclaw.com/how-toremove-news-articles-from-google-and-internet (Feb. 24, 2022) (claiming that the law firm has “obtained
removals of hundreds of online news articles”). See generally R. Michael Hoefges, Taking It Back in
Cyberspace: State Retraction Statutes, Defamation Suits Against Online Newspapers, 19 NEWSPAPER RSCH. J.
95 (1998) (discussing how retraction statutes apply to online newspapers).
121. KFAI Brief, supra note 107, at 21–22.
122. NetChoice, Inc. v. Paxton, 2021 WL 5755120, at *50 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2021).
123. The Florida district court judge also addressed this issue in NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, 546 F.Supp.3d
1082, 1093 (N.D. Fla. 2021) saying, “it cannot be said that a social media platform, to whom most content is
invisible to a substantial extent, is indistinguishable for First Amendment purposes from a newspaper or other
traditional medium. But neither can it be said that a platform engages only in conduct, not speech.”
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Social media platforms “routinely manage . . . content, allowing most,
banning some, arranging content in ways intended to make it more useful or
desirable for users, sometimes adding their own content.” Making those
decisions entails some level of editorial discretion, even if portions of those
tasks are carried out by software code. While this Court acknowledges that a
social media platform’s editorial discretion does not fit neatly with our 20th
[c]entury vision of a newspaper editor hand-selecting an article to publish,
focusing on whether a human or AI makes those decisions is a distraction.
It is indeed new and exciting—or frightening, depending on who you ask—
that algorithms do some of the work that a newspaper publisher previously
did, but the core question is still whether a private company exercises
editorial discretion over the dissemination of content, not the exact
process used….This Court is convinced that social media platforms, or at
least those covered by HB 20, curate both users and content to convey a
message about the type of community the platform seeks to foster and, as such,
exercise editorial discretion over their platform’s content.124

This passage deftly cuts through all of the distracting sophistry about machines,
algorithms, and automation to highlight the only question that matters: do social
media platforms exercise editorial discretion? As indicated at this subpart’s
beginning, the answer is, and always has been, clearly “yes.”
In contrast with the Knight First Amendment Institute brief’s argument, the
Paxton court specifically noted how social media platforms make their
publication decisions to “convey a message about the type of community the
platform seeks to foster.”125 In other words, each social media platform caters to
the needs of its audience, and those needs differ from other social media
platforms because the services’ audiences differ.126 Audience-specific curation
is essential to a social media platform’s successful functioning; as the court says,
“content moderation [is] the very tool that social medial [sic] platforms employ
to make their platforms safe, useful, and enjoyable for users.”127
Thus, the NetChoice v. Paxton decision indicates that social media
platforms and other online publishers of third-party content qualify for the same
constitutional protections as traditional publishers, which necessitates strict
scrutiny for mandatory editorial transparency laws. With respect to the meansfit analysis, the Paxton court noted that Texas’ requirements were “inordinately
burdensome,”128 compelled publishers to speak when they do not want to, and
124. NetChoice, Inc. v. Paxton, 2021 WL 5755120, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2021) (emphasis added).
125. Id.
126. Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Democracy & Technology et al. Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant
Twitter, Inc. Urging Reversal, at 12, Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton, No. 21-15689 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Content moderation
requires innumerable exercises of editorial discretion that shape what users can say and what information they
receive.”) [hereinafter CDT Brief]; id. at 20–22 (discussing how UGC services make their editorial decisions).
127. NetChoice, Inc. v. Paxton, 2021 WL 5755120, at *14 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2021).
128. See Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 2019) (Maryland’s law “makes certain
political speech more expensive to host than other speech because compliance costs attach to the former and not
to the latter. Accordingly, when election-related political speech brings in less cash or carries more obligations
than all the other advertising options, there is much less reason for platforms to host such speech”).
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exposed social media platforms to enforcement consequences that “chill the
social media platforms’ speech and application of their content moderation
policies and user agreements.”129
Depending on a law’s specific details, mandated editorial transparency
imposed on Internet services could trigger (or fail) strict scrutiny for additional
reasons, such as:
Distinctions between media types. The Supreme Court said in Reno v.
ACLU that cases allowing incursions into other media categories do not provide
any “basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be
applied to the Internet.”130 Any editorial transparency law that treats Internet
services worse than offline publishers seemingly violates this principle.
Distinctions between media entities based on size. Linking editorial
transparency to entity size creates a regulatory catch-22.131 Without safe harbors
for small entities, the compliance costs and burdens have a greater risk of driving
them out of the industry.132 On the other hand, if a law distinguishes between
smaller and larger entities, the regulator must justify the differential treatment
and explain why the selected size cutoff appropriately advances those
justifications.133 Also, the pool of regulated entities cannot be so narrow that the
law looks retaliatory or becomes a bill of attainder.
The law’s specifics may be impermissibly vague.134

129. NetChoice, Inc. v. Paxton, 2021 WL 5755120, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2021).
130. Reno v. Am. C.L. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 845 (1997).
131. See Eric Goldman & Jess Miers, Regulating Internet Services by Size, 2 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 24,
26–28 (2021) (discussing the many challenges associated with making size-based distinctions among Internet
services).
132. See Comments of Michael Masnick Opposing the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration’s Petition for Rulemaking, In the Matter of Section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934
(Sept. 2, 2020), https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/7192747/Michael-Masnick-FCC-Comments-RM11862.pdf:
A mandate for transparency would likely burden a small site like Techdirt in multiple ways. First, it
would require costly lawyers and review to make sure we were in compliance with any stated
administrative rules. Second, it would likely make our moderation practices significantly worse, as
we would not be able to continue to freely experiment and innovate around how we handle content
moderation on the site, as any change would require careful and expensive vetting to remain in
compliance.
Finally, it would likely make the experience for our community significantly worse and less useful
and hospitable.
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 8, at 738 (“mandated disclosure can have anticompetitive effects”).
133. See NetChoice, Inc. v. Paxton, 2021 WL 5755120 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2021) (discussing Texas’ lack
of evidence in justifying its cutoff); NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, 546 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1094 (N.D. Fla. 2021)
(“[D]iscrimination between speakers is often a tell for content discrimination. . . . the application of [Florida’s]
requirements to only a small subset of social-media entities would be sufficient, standing alone, to subject these
statutes to strict scrutiny.”). Cf. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936) (“The form in which the
tax is imposed is in itself suspicious. It is not measured or limited by the volume of advertisements. It is measured
alone by the extent of the circulation of the publication in which the advertisements are carried, with the plain
purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of newspapers.”).
134. See NetChoice, Inc. v. Paxton, 2021 WL 5755120, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2021) (holding that
several phrases in Texas’ social media censorship law were vague).
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C. TWITTER V. PAXTON: A CASE STUDY OF WEAPONIZED EDITORIAL
TRANSPARENCY
As this Article has emphasized, the implications of compelled source-data
disclosure deserve heightened attention. As Part II.A showed, such disclosures
distort the publisher’s speech decisions and bring the “state into an unhealthy
entanglement with” publishers.135 Furthermore, censorship-minded regulators
can use their investigatory or enforcement powers for retaliatory or other
pretextual purposes, to drain a publisher’s resources, or to obtain improper
access to citizens’ private information.136
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton’s investigations into Twitter provides
a case study of these concerns. The lawsuit relates to Twitter’s “deplatforming”
of then-President Donald Trump following the U.S. Capitol insurrection on
January 6, 2021.137 After Twitter permanently suspended Trump’s account,
Paxton tweeted: “I will fight them [including Twitter] with all I’ve got.”138
Paxton’s office opened an investigation and issued a civil investigation demand
(CID) to Twitter. While on the surface Paxton’s move might appear like a
routine action by an attorney general to protect the public interest, it is not.139
First, Paxton repeatedly made clear that he was retaliating against Twitter
for deciding to stop publishing Trump’s content.140 Not surprisingly, Twitter
received this message from Paxton’s moves: “Change your content-moderation
decisions to favor my political allies, or there will be serious consequences.”141
Second, the CID sought an invasively deep look into Twitter’s editorial
processes. In particular, the CID demanded “all…policies and procedures
related to content moderation on your platform, including any policies or
procedures that limit the reach or visibility of content intended for public
viewers.”142 Because “content moderation” and “editorial decisions” are
synonyms, the CID demanded every document regarding every editorial
decision that Twitter has ever prepared.
Third, the CID is “continuing in nature,” and Twitter cannot wrest free of
the CID until/unless the Texas AG’s office compels Twitter’s response.143

135. Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 518 (4th Cir. 2019).
136. For example, source-data disclosures may include depublished items that posters disavowed. Also,
regulators could seek non-public postings of political or personal enemies for targeting purposes.
137. Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER: BLOG (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.
138. Ken Paxton (@KenPaxtonTX), TWITTER (Jan. 9, 2021, 11:58 AM), https://twitter.com/KenPaxtonTX/
status/1347996281461989376.
139. See generally CDT Brief, supra note 126 (outlining many problems with Paxton’s enforcement).
140. Twitter Appellate Brief, supra note 48, at 11.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Off. of the Att’y Gen. of Tex., Consumer Prot. Div., Civil Investigative Demand to Twitter, Inc., ¶ 2
(Jan.
13,
2021),
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/images/admin/2021/Press/
Twitter-Parler%20CID%20011321.pdf [hereinafter Texas CID].
143. See Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton, 2021 WL 1893140 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2021); Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton, 2021
WL 2334133 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2021); Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 19557 (9th Cir. June 30,
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Leaving the CID as an ongoing obligation puts Twitter in an impossible
position,144 because every editorial choice it makes might simultaneously trigger
disclosure via the CID. This has an unquestionably chilling effect. As Twitter
explained, “Any time a Twitter employee thinks about writing something related
to content moderation, the employee knows that AG Paxton has already
demanded production of whatever the employee chooses to write. . . . [That]
would lead a person of ‘ordinary firmness’ to think twice about what to write or
what editorial decisions to make and document.”145
Paxton’s investigation of Twitter, including his use of the ongoing CID,
shows the censorship potential of editorial transparency.146 Through actual or
threatened enforcement, regulators can influence what content Internet services
publish—and punish Internet services for making editorial decisions the
regulators disagree with.147 This enables regulators—especially elected
officials—to pursue investigations and enforcement actions purely for political
payoffs, such as showing their constituents how they are “tough on Big Tech.”
If courts do not curb abusive enforcement actions and investigations initiated
under the guise of editorial transparency, many more will follow.
It is noteworthy that Paxton based Twitter’s CID on Texas’ general
consumer protection law,148 not the social media censorship law (which had not
yet been enacted). Though mandatory editorial transparency laws provide a clear
template for censorial investigations and enforcements, regulators can also coopt standard consumer protection, false advertising, and unfair and deceptive
practices laws to support illegitimate editorial transparency investigations and
enforcement.149 Indeed, the “consumer protection” legal framing could help
regulators obfuscate otherwise-illegitimate motives. Given this risk, courts
should skeptically review all editorial transparency-based investigations and

2021). While this article was in press, the Ninth Circuit again rejected Twitter’s concerns. Twitter, Inc. v. Paxton,
26 F.4th 1119 (9th Cir. 2022).
144. See CDT Brief, supra note 126, at 23–30.
145. Twitter Appellate Brief, supra note 48, at 23.
146. As a precursor to Paxton’s effort, former Mississippi AG Jim Hood investigated Google’s editorial
decisions regarding its search results. See generally Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2016). Like
Twitter, Google could not proactively enjoin the investigation—despite the MPAA’s improper role in the
enforcement. See, e.g., Russell Brandom, Project Goliath: Inside Hollywood’s Secret War Against Google, THE
VERGE (Dec. 12, 2014, 12:59 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2014/12/12/7382287/project-goliath.
147. CDT Brief, supra note 112, at 7, 9 (“[G]overnments around the world increasingly are using
investigations and threats of other penalties to engage in censorship by pressuring or punishing hosts for making
content moderation decisions with which they disagree. . . . even pre-enforcement, threatened punishment of
speech has a chilling effect.”).
148. See Texas CID, supra note 142.
149. An example: under the pretense of protecting privacy, the FTC made unnecessarily invasive demands
about Internet services’ editorial practices, including demanding to know “how the Company targets, surfaces,
or promotes content” and “how user-created content presentation is influenced by, impacted by, or in any way
associated with the Company’s advertising goals and outcomes,” and demanding “all of the Company’s content
moderation policies and content promotion policies.” See Order to File a Special Report, FTC Matter No.
P205402, ¶¶ 33, 35 (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/6b-orders-file-specialreports-social-media-service-providers/6bs_order_os_final.pdf.
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enforcements, no matter what legal authority the regulator invokes to justify
their actions.150
III. ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO VALIDATE EDITORIAL
TRANSPARENCY DISCLOSURES
Part II identified the constitutional problems caused by regulators’ demand
for source-data disclosures from publishers. This Part evaluates the feasibility of
three potential workarounds to this issue: (1) third-party auditing, (2) procedural
requirements, and (3) empowerment of independent researchers.
A. THIRD-PARTY AUDITING
Third-party audits are sometimes used in mandatory disclosure contexts,
such as financial statements filed by publicly listed companies. Similarly,
instead of disclosing source data to regulators or the public, Internet services
could have third parties audit their editorial disclosures.
With respect to editorial transparency, a third-party audit requirement
theoretically removes the need for regulators to obtain source data. Furthermore,
the audit increases the likelihood of accurate disclosures because the auditor
cares about its reputation151 and will be risk-averse about any possible
inaccuracies.
To succeed, any audit requirement will need a cohort of auditors who have
expertise in editorial operation audits, and that expertise needs to be backed by
a credentialing process.152 Neither currently exists.153 Regulators could help
150. As Twitter explained, consumer protection-based enforcement over Twitter’s public representations
about its editorial practices “would be no more legitimate than a law-enforcement official’s investigation of
statements by traditional media outlets, such as newspapers or cable news networks, regarding their publicly
professed editorial philosophies (for example, that they deliver ‘All the News That’s Fit to Print’ or are ‘Fair
and Balanced.’).” Twitter Appellate Brief, supra note 48, at 41; see also Brief of Amici Curiae, The Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press & Media L. Resource Ctr., Inc. Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 6, Twitter,
Inc. v. Paxton, No. 21-15689 (9th Cir. 2022) (discussing how regulators can misuse consumer protection laws).
151. For example, the accounting firm Arthur Andersen imploded when their complicity in the Enron
scandal became clear. See Ken Brown & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Arthur Andersen’s Fall from Grace is a Sad Tale
of Greed and Miscues, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2002), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1023409436545200.
152. See generally Julian Jaursch, Why the EU Needs to Get Audits for Tech Companies Right, TECHDIRT
(Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210818/16443447385/why-eu-needs-to-get-audits-techcompanies-right.shtml (discussing some challenges of configuring audit obligations for UGC services).
153. Industry efforts to encourage audits are underway. Digital Trust & Safety Partnership (DTSP) members
will obtain independent third-party verification of their compliance with the DTSP best practices framework.
See generally DIGIT. TR. & SAFETY P’SHIP, THE SAFE FRAMEWORK: TAILORING A PROPORTIONATE APPROACH
TO ASSESSING DIGITAL TRUST & SAFETY (2021), https://dtspartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/
DTSP_Safe_Framework.pdf. GARM is also pushing for audits to address brand safety. See Kate Kaye, Getting
Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, Twitter and Others to Independent GARM Brand Safety Verification is a
Diplomatic Dance, DIGIDAY (May 24, 2021), https://digiday.com/marketing/as-facebook-commits-toindependent-garm-brand-safety-verification-getting-youtube-tiktok-twitter-and-others-on-board-is-adiplomatic-dance. “Social media councils” could also provide audit services to their members. See, e.g., DIGI.
GLOB. POL’Y INCUBATOR, ARTICLE 19 & U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF OPINION & EXPRESSION,
SOCIAL MEDIA COUNCILS: FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY 32 (2019), https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/
s3fs-public/gdpiart_19_smc_conference_report_wip_2019-05-12_final_1.pdf.
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accelerate the development of a credentialing process and a community of
credentialed auditors through financial incentives and other infrastructure
support.
Third-party editorial audits mitigate, but do not eliminate, the need for
source-data disclosures to regulators. While auditors’ statements would need to
be double-checked less frequently than Internet services’ unaudited selfdisclosures, any regulatory double-checking would require a review of the same
source data reviewed by the auditors. That takes us right back to the initial
problem.
Furthermore, the costs of third-party editorial audits could be prohibitive
for many services. As an analogy, publicly listed companies on average spent
$2.5 million in 2020 to prepare audited financial statements.154 Those high costs
reflect the huge number of records involved in a financial audit. Yet, that volume
of records would be trivial compared to editorial audits, which could involve
billions of “auditable” records each day. The associated costs inevitably would
force some services out of the industry.
B. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
In addition, or as an alternative, to mandatory editorial transparency,
regulators could impose procedural requirements for editorial operations, such
as requiring publishers to designate an officer in charge of transparency
compliance or requiring publishers to produce their mandated disclosures using
specified software.155 While regulators have imposed compliance mechanics on
other corporate functions, they sound a lot like government control over editorial
operations.
C. EMPOWERMENT OF INDEPENDENT RESEARCHERS
If independent researchers can obtain the right data from Internet services,
the researchers can help hold services accountable.156 Their research can confirm
Internet services’ public disclosures, generate transparency report-like statistics,
and identify publication anomalies that services might not voluntarily disclose
(or even recognize).
But how can independent researchers obtain the necessary data? Internet
services offer APIs that researchers could access, and Facebook has a “sandbox”

154. FERF’S 12th Annual Public Company Audit Fee Study Report Reveals Acquisitions and Economic
Uncertainty as Primary Contributors to Increased Audit Scope and Fees, PR NEWSWIRE (Nov. 2, 2021),
https://www.yahoo.com/now/ferfs-12th-annual-public-company-120000059.html.
155. See generally SANTA CLARA PRINCIPLES ON TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTENT
MODERATION, TOOLKIT FOR SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES (2021), https://santaclaraprinciples.org/images/
SantaClara_Companies.pdf (enumerating various procedural commitments that companies can make regarding
their editorial operations).
156. See Nicolas P. Suzor, Sarah Meyers West, Andrew Quodling, & Jillian York, What Do We Mean When
We Talk About Transparency? Towards Meaningful Transparency in Commercial Content Moderation,
13 INT’L J. COMM. 1526, 1529 (2019); MACCARTHY TAWG, supra note 6, at 13–14.

1230

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:5

that provides data access to researchers subject to some privacy protections.157
Yet, so long as the Internet service provides data to researchers, the service can
cherry-pick the shared data and distort any research findings.158
Researcher scraping159 may be a better option. Via scraping, independent
researchers could create datasets without service cherry-picking (though
scraping would not reach some data, such as unpublished content or content in
private messaging systems). Plus, regulators could authorize researcher scraping
without encountering the same constitutional problems associated with
mandatory editorial transparency,160 though there still could be concerns about
Fifth Amendment takings or distinctions among speakers.
For this option to be viable, legal reforms would be required. Scraping
currently occupies a legal gray zone. Scraping is a ubiquitous Internet practice,
but the law does not clearly permit third parties to engage in unrestricted
scraping—even for independent research purposes.161 Furthermore, unless
prohibited from doing so,162 Internet services could selectively block scraping
to serve their proprietary interests, such as blocking researchers they consider
adversarial.163
Thus, if independent researchers are going to become the policy solution
to increase accountability of Internet services, regulators would need to force the
services to permit independent researcher scraping.164 Regulators could further
enhance the accountability mechanisms by financially supporting independent
research.
However, regulators would need to tread carefully with who benefits from
any compulsory right to scrape. This right cannot be extended to everyone. Many
entities would love to have unrestricted scraping access for dubious or
157. See SOC. SCI. ONE, https://socialscience.one (last visited July 1, 2022).
158. See Laura Edelson & Damon McCoy, Opinion, We Research Misinformation on Facebook. It Just
Disabled Our Accounts., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/10/opinion/facebookmisinformation.html (“[O]ur work shows that the archive of political ads that Facebook makes available to
researchers is missing more than 100,000 ads.”); see also MACCARTHY TAWG, supra note 6, at 14.
159. “Web scraping generally refers to the retrieval of content posted on the World Wide Web through the
use of a program other than a web browser or an application programming interface (API).” Andrew Sellars,
Twenty Years of Web Scraping and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 372, 373
(2018); see also Han-Wei Liu, Two Decades of Laws And Practice Around Screen Scraping in the Common Law
World and Its Open Banking Watershed Moment, 30 WASH. INT’L L.J. 28, 28 (2020) (defining “screen scraping”
as “using an agent to collect, parse, and organize data from the web in an automated manner”).
160. See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2–3 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing how independent research
scraping efforts may be protected by the First Amendment); see also Jeff Hermes, Does the First Amendment
Include a Right to Scrape Photographs from Public Websites?, 2020 MEDIA L. RES. CTR. BULL. 41 (2020).
161. Compare Sandvig v. Barr, 451 F. Supp. 3d 73 (D.D.C. 2020) (implicitly authorizing scraping for
academic research purposes) with Facebook, Inc. v. BrandTotal LLC, 499 F. Supp. 3d 720 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
(Facebook can block data gathering by a corporate researcher).
162. See hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 988, 995 (9th Cir. 2019); hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn
Corp., 31 F.4th 1180 (9th Cir. 2022).
163. See, e.g., Mike Clark, Research Cannot Be the Justification for Compromising People’s Privacy, META
(Aug. 3, 2021), https://about.fb.com/news/2021/08/research-cannot-be-the-justification-for-compromisingpeoples-privacy.
164. See, e.g., Platform Accountability and Transparency Act, S. 979 (117th Cong. 2021).
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illegitimate reasons, including data brokers, analytics services, consumerprofiling companies,165 and other privacy-invasive services;166 as well as state
actors who are data-mining their own citizens or building adversarial profiles of
other countries’ citizens. Further, unrestricted scraping could become an
unmanageable financial drain for Internet services.
Limiting scraping rights to “researchers” partially solves those problems,
but malefactors could claim this status. For example, Facebook’s data leakage
to Cambridge Analytica—part of Russia’s campaign to interfere with the 2016
United States elections—was caused by an academic researcher.167
Thus, any compelled scraping access right must distinguish between
legitimate independent researchers and pretextual researchers like Cambridge
Analytica.168 It would also need to allow Internet services to manage the
potentially significant burdens that independent researcher scraping could
impose on their computer systems. Finally, datasets in researchers’ possession
pose significant privacy and security risks, so those researchers would need to
implement privacy and security protections that are vigorously policed.
Despite these significant challenges, independent researcher-generated
transparency deserves further consideration as a substitute for mandatory
editorial transparency. And as a substitute, it shows how mandatory editorial
transparency may not be the least restrictive means available to legislators to
achieve their policy goals.
CONCLUSION
In closing, this Article highlights two reasons why free speech enthusiasts
should reconsider any support for mandatory editorial transparency.
First, mandatory editorial transparency might feel like a low-risk way to
increase Big Tech accountability, but it’s a trap. Mandatory editorial
transparency will enhance regulators’ power over online speech, and they will
use those powers in ways that are adverse to their constituents’ interests, such as

165. As just one example, Clearview AI—a controversial facial recognition vendor—claims it has scraped
10 billion images. See Will Knight, Clearview AI Has New Tools to Identify You in Photos, WIRED (Oct. 4,
2021), https://www.wired.com/story/clearview-ai-new-tools-identify-you-photos/.
166. See generally Zachary Gold & Mark Latonero, Robots Welcome? Ethical and Legal Considerations
for Web Crawling and Scraping, 13 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 275 (2018); Benjamin L. W. Sobel, A New
Common Law of Web Scraping, 25 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 147 (2021); Geoffrey Xiao, Note, Bad Bots:
Regulating the Scraping of Public Personal Information, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 701 (2021).
167. See Att’y Gen. v. Facebook, Inc., 487 Mass. 109, 118 (2021). See generally In re Facebook, Inc.,
Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, 402 F. Supp. 3d 767 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Kogan v. Facebook, Inc., 334
F.R.D. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
168. See MACCARTHY TAWG, supra note 6, at 16 (discussing the importance of “tiered access”); cf.
Christopher Morten, Publicizing Corporate Secrets for Public Good, 171 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4041556 (arguing that government agencies should provide some constituent
communities with additional but controlled access to corporate data in their possession).
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controlling speech they do not like.169 Texas AG Paxton’s retaliatory
investigation into Twitter shows how online speech will irreparably suffer when
regulators weaponize editorial transparency.
Second, free speech advocates may hope that adoption of editorial
transparency laws might reduce regulators’ motivation to enact more damaging
anti-speech regulations.170 This is also a trap. Unconstitutional “solutions” are
never a real alternative to other unconstitutional regulations.171 Further,
regulators will not treat transparency as a substitute for unconstitutionally
invasive regulation, as Florida and Texas showed when they packaged
transparency requirements with other censorship policies.
If mandatory transparency is not the solution, then what is? This Article
suggested a few policy ideas worth further exploration, such as spurring the
certification of editorial audit professionals and perhaps enabling independent
researcher scraping through legal reform and financial support. Otherwise,
regulators should deploy their resources to encourage pro-social online activity,
such as increased digital citizenship education and funding for research into
content moderation best practices.172 If regulators view their roles as facilitators
of healthy online interactions rather than as disciplinarians, they are far more
likely to achieve policy outcomes that benefit their constituents without
violating the Constitution.

169. A Note to Regulators, SANTA CLARA PRINCIPLES, https://santaclaraprinciples.org/regulators/ (last
visited July 1, 2022) (warning that regulators “state actors must not exploit or manipulate companies’ content
moderation systems to censor dissenters, political opponents, social movements, or any person”).
170. See Mike Masnick, Transparency is Important; Mandated Transparency is Dangerous and Will Stifle
Innovation and Competition, TECHDIRT (Oct. 29, 2020, 9:38 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20201028/17461945607/transparency-is-important-mandated-transparency-is-dangerous-will-stifleinnovation-competition.shtml (“I’ve heard from a variety of policymakers over the last few months who also
seem focused on this transparency issue as a ‘narrow’ way to reform 230 without mucking up everything
else . . .”).
171. Cf. Comm.-Serv. Broad. of Mid-Am., Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (striking
down a mandatory recordkeeping and disclosure law that, during enactment, was characterized as an alternative
to censorship).
172. See Eric Goldman, Section 230’s Application to States’ Regulation of Social Media 6 (Santa Clara
Univ. Legal Studs. Rsch. Paper, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3961703.

